

# SESAR Solution Regulatory Overview

# Enhanced STCA with down-linked parameters

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linked parameters

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#### **Abstract**

This document contains an overview of the SESAR Solutions documented recommendations from regulatory, standardisation, oversight and certification perspectives resulting from the cooperation with EASA and National Authorities.

### **Authoring & Approval**

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#### 1 Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the SESAR Solutions documented recommendations from regulatory, standardisation, oversight and certification perspectives resulting from the cooperation with EASA and National.

The document presents the recommendations issued by the National Authorities and EASA, for an acceptable deployment of the concepts contained in the SESAR Solution. These recommendations must be taken into consideration by the entities in charge of deployment of the correspondent SESAR Solution.

#### 2 General recommendations

In general terms, it must be underlined that:

- 1) When deploying a SESAR Solution, the compliance with all applicable regulatory requirements must be ensured by the different concerned entities;
- In particular, it must be ensured that the appropriate safety argument for the concerned change to the ATM functional system is performed in accordance with EC regulation 1035/2011 considering local specific risks and mitigation to those risks.
- 3) The present SESAR Solution does not constitute in itself an acceptable Means of Compliance with the previously mentioned regulatory requirements. Means of Compliance are subject to their acceptance by the Authorities involved in each concrete local implementation.
- 4) A verification of the existing standardisation and regulatory frameworks has to be done at the date of local deployment to identify possible major changes to the one in use at the moment of publication of this SESAR Solution.

## 3 Specific recommendations

### 3.1 On the Regulatory Framework

The concept related to STCA+DAPs, at this stage, has not impact on current Regulation activities.

#### 3.2 On the Standardisation Framework

There is no specific topic on the standardisation framework field to be specially considered in deployment, beyond the currently existing applicable standardisation.

### 3.3 On the Regulatory Oversight and Certification Activities

The interaction with airborne safety nets could be considered. The benefits of the concept could be refined through the analysis of recorded data, in particular on the headings.

In the elaboration of safety arguments in operational sites, hazards derived from local conditions must be taken into account; in particular, but not limited to:

- the applicable legal framework;
- the safety net presence;
- the different ENR and TMA scenarios for various operations;
- the abnormal conditions to verify the safety condition;
- the latency created by the interface with other elements (radar, flight strips);
- the level of awareness of the ATCOs and their reaction to nuisance alerts;
- the presence of unavoidable nuisance alerts and their impact on safety;
- the capability of the STCA able to manage data on RVSM approval of local traffic.

Consistency between the conflict prediction algorithms and the STCA performance shall be verified at the local operational scenario.

New modes of separation might modify the operation of Safety Nets, in each particular local context. and a Safety Net cannot be considered a separation provision tool, as it should not provide safety credit to the nominal operation. The specific training needs should be taken into account relevant to the local circumstances and local operations.

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